Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous… Mehr…
Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using theoretical economic models and complex numerical simulations, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. As the models allow for considerable heterogeneity of households, including a history-dependent labor productivity, it is possible to analyze how certain policies affect individuals in a specific age, wealth or skill group. The most important aspect of an unemployment insurance system turns out to be the benefits paid to the long-term unemployed. If this parameter is chosen too high, a large number of households may get caught in a long spell of unemployment with little chance of finding work again. Based on the predictions in these models, the so-called Hartz IV labor market reform recently adopted in Germany should have highly favorable effects on the unemployment rates and welfare in the long run. Trade Books>Hardcover>Business>Accounting,Finance>Accounting,Finance, Mohr Siebeck Core >2<
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Hardback, [PU: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck)], Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high … Mehr…
Hardback, [PU: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck)], Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using theoretical economic models and complex numerical simulations, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. As the models allow for considerable heterogeneity of households, including a history-dependent labor productivity, it is possible to analyze how certain policies affect individuals in a specific age, wealth or skill group. The most important aspect of an unemployment insurance system turns out to be the benefits paid to the long-term unemployed. If this parameter is chosen too high, a large number of households may get caught in a long spell of unemployment with little chance of finding work again. Based on the predictions in these models, the so-called "Hartz IV" labor market reform recently adopted in Germany should have highly favorable effects on the unemployment rates and welfare in the long run., Economic Theory & Philosophy, Economic Theory & Philosophy<
Hardback, [PU: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck)], Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high … Mehr…
Hardback, [PU: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck)], Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using theoretical economic models and complex numerical simulations, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. As the models allow for considerable heterogeneity of households, including a history-dependent labor productivity, it is possible to analyze how certain policies affect individuals in a specific age, wealth or skill group. The most important aspect of an unemployment insurance system turns out to be the benefits paid to the long-term unemployed. If this parameter is chosen too high, a large number of households may get caught in a long spell of unemployment with little chance of finding work again. Based on the predictions in these models, the so-called Hartz IV labor market reform recently adopted in Germany should have highly favorable effects on the unemployment rates and welfare in the long run., Economic Theory & Philosophy, Economic Theory & Philosophy<
Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous… Mehr…
Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using theoretical economic models and complex numerical simulations, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. As the models allow for considerable heterogeneity of households, including a history-dependent labor productivity, it is possible to analyze how certain policies affect individuals in a specific age, wealth or skill group. The most important aspect of an unemployment insurance system turns out to be the benefits paid to the long-term unemployed. If this parameter is chosen too high, a large number of households may get caught in a long spell of unemployment with little chance of finding work again. Based on the predictions in these models, the so-called Hartz IV labor market reform recently adopted in Germany should have highly favorable effects on the unemployment rates and welfare in the long run. Trade Books>Hardcover>Business>Accounting,Finance>Accounting,Finance, Mohr Siebeck Core >2<
Hardback, [PU: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck)], Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high … Mehr…
Hardback, [PU: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck)], Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using theoretical economic models and complex numerical simulations, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. As the models allow for considerable heterogeneity of households, including a history-dependent labor productivity, it is possible to analyze how certain policies affect individuals in a specific age, wealth or skill group. The most important aspect of an unemployment insurance system turns out to be the benefits paid to the long-term unemployed. If this parameter is chosen too high, a large number of households may get caught in a long spell of unemployment with little chance of finding work again. Based on the predictions in these models, the so-called "Hartz IV" labor market reform recently adopted in Germany should have highly favorable effects on the unemployment rates and welfare in the long run., Economic Theory & Philosophy, Economic Theory & Philosophy<
Hardback, [PU: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck)], Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high … Mehr…
Hardback, [PU: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck)], Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using theoretical economic models and complex numerical simulations, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. As the models allow for considerable heterogeneity of households, including a history-dependent labor productivity, it is possible to analyze how certain policies affect individuals in a specific age, wealth or skill group. The most important aspect of an unemployment insurance system turns out to be the benefits paid to the long-term unemployed. If this parameter is chosen too high, a large number of households may get caught in a long spell of unemployment with little chance of finding work again. Based on the predictions in these models, the so-called Hartz IV labor market reform recently adopted in Germany should have highly favorable effects on the unemployment rates and welfare in the long run., Economic Theory & Philosophy, Economic Theory & Philosophy<
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Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for a society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using economic and econometric models, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. Numerical simulations are used to compute efficient insurance schemes under various assumptions.
Detailangaben zum Buch - Optimal Unemployment Insurance
EAN (ISBN-13): 9783161493041 ISBN (ISBN-10): 3161493044 Gebundene Ausgabe Erscheinungsjahr: 2007 Herausgeber: Mohr Siebeck 178 Seiten Gewicht: 0,426 kg Sprache: eng/Englisch
Buch in der Datenbank seit 2007-06-17T11:04:37+02:00 (Zurich) Detailseite zuletzt geändert am 2023-04-16T12:59:06+02:00 (Zurich) ISBN/EAN: 9783161493041
ISBN - alternative Schreibweisen: 3-16-149304-4, 978-3-16-149304-1 Alternative Schreibweisen und verwandte Suchbegriffe: Autor des Buches: pollak, andreas gryphius, mohr andreas Titel des Buches: optimal, insurance
Daten vom Verlag:
Autor/in: Andreas Pollak Titel: Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft; Optimal Unemployment Insurance Verlag: Mohr Siebeck 178 Seiten Erscheinungsjahr: 2007-05-05 Tübingen; DE Gedruckt / Hergestellt in Deutschland. Gewicht: 0,438 kg Sprache: Englisch 109,00 € (DE) 112,10 € (AT) Available
BB; B401; Hardcover, Softcover / Wirtschaft/Volkswirtschaft; Wirtschaftspolitik, politische Ökonomie; Verstehen; Wirtschaft; Unemployment; Unemployment Insurance; Social Insurance; Wirtschaftstheorie und -philosophie; Öffentliches Finanz- und Rechnungswesen; Öffentliche Finanzen, Besteuerung; EB; E107
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