Leon Carroll Marshall:Our Economic Organization (1921)
- Taschenbuch ISBN: 9781164950080
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Paperback / softback. New. Sovereignty and the Sacred challenges contemporary models of polity and economy through a two-step engagement with the history of religions. Beginning with the… Mehr…
Paperback / softback. New. Sovereignty and the Sacred challenges contemporary models of polity and economy through a two-step engagement with the history of religions. Beginning with the recognition of the convergence in the history of European political theology between the sacred and the sovereign as creating "states of exception"--that is, moments of rupture in the normative order that, by transcending this order, are capable of re-founding or remaking it--Robert A. Yelle identifies our secular, capitalist system as an attempt to exclude such moments by subordinating them to the calculability of laws and markets. The second step marshals evidence from history and anthropology that helps us to recognize the contribution of such states of exception to ethical life, as a means of release from the legal or economic order. Yelle draws on evidence from the Hebrew Bible to English deism, and from the Aztecs to ancient India, to develop a theory of polity that finds a place and a purpose for those aspects of religion that are often marginalized and dismissed as irrational by Enlightenment liberalism and utilitarianism. Developing this close analogy between two elemental domains of society, Sovereignty and the Sacred offers a new theory of religion while suggesting alternative ways of organizing our political and economic life. By rethinking the transcendent foundations and liberating potential of both religion and politics, Yelle points to more hopeful and ethical modes of collective life based on egalitarianism and popular sovereignty. Deliberately countering the narrowness of currently dominant economic, political, and legal theories, he demonstrates the potential of a revived history of religions to contribute to a rethinking of the foundations of our political and social order., 6, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982. First Edition [Stated], First Printing [Stated]. Hardcover. very good. 24 cm, 527, illus., maps, notes, index, slight wear to spine edges, ink name inside front flyleaf. George Wildman Ball (December 21, 1909 - May 26, 1994) was an American diplomat and banker. He served in the management of the US State Department from 1961 to 1966 and is remembered most as the only major dissenter against the escalation of the Vietnam War. He refused to publicize his doubts, which were based on calculations that South Vietnam was doomed. He also helped determine American policy regarding trade expansion, Congo, the Multilateral Force, de Gaulle's France, Israel and the rest of the Middle East, and the Iranian Revolution. During 1942, he became an official of the Lend Lease program. During 1944 and 1945, he was director of the Strategic Bombing Survey in London. During 1945, Ball began collaboration with Jean Monnet and the French government in its economic recovery in its negotiations regarding the Marshall Plan. During 1950 he helped draft the Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty. Ball was the Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs for the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. He is known for his opposition to escalation of the Vietnam War. Ball also served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from June 26 to September 25, 1968. During August 1968 at the UN Security Council, he endorsed the Czechoslovaks' struggle against the Soviet invasion and their right to live without dictatorship. During Nixon's administration, he helped draft policy proposals on the Persian Gulf. Derived from a Kirkus review: George Ball--New Deal "dogsbody," Lend-Lease policy-shaper, strategic-bombing investigator, "ardent advocate of liberal trade," international lawyer, Under Secretary of State (1960-66)--was often told by his friend Jean Monnet, he recounts, that he spread himself too thin. But that very absence of driving ambition or a fixed commitment, whatever the cost to a public career, is a godsend in a memoirist: with the events, we get the afterthoughts, the open questions; with the certitudes, the doubts. A less inquiring, less skeptical man would also not have been the only top official to challenge, from day one, American intervention in Vietnam. Ball went to Northwestern and passed into the hands--manna for a shaky ego--of upstart instructor "Benny" De Voto and 18th-century specialist Garrett Mattingly. New Deal Washington was for him, as for others, a moment when "nothing was impossible." Chicago law practice began a 35-year friendship with Stevenson. Lend-Lease planted the idea of "a postwar economic environment" free of the constraints and conflicts of the inter-war period. On the strategic-bombing survey, in a still-armed Reich: "Speer met us in the Great Hall, friendly and self-consciously affable... 'I'm glad you've come,' he said. 'I was afraid I'd been forgotten." There then follows reducing Jean Monnet's visionary ideas of a unified Europe "to coherent expression"; the first exhilarating Stevenson campaign, the "dismal" 1956 anticlimax; the multifarious foreign-policy embroilments of the Kennedy and early Johnson years--the Congo, the Cuban missile crisis, Cyprus, de Gaulle and NATO, the Dominican intervention; LBJ himself; and, in Ball's words: "The Vietnam Aberration"-which may be the finest exposition extant of the refusal to ask "why?" and the reluctance to turn back. When Ball finally left, in late '66, he left quietly--so as not to use his "privileged information" to undercut the US; but that question, too, he throws open to discussion. It's one of the great, examined public lives of our time., W. W. Norton & Company, 1982, 3, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1982. First Edition [Stated], First Printing [Stated]. Hardcover. Very good/Good. 24 cm. xii, [2], 527, [1] pages. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Some wear to DJ edges. George Wildman Ball (December 21, 1909 - May 26, 1994) was an American diplomat and banker. He served in the management of the US State Department from 1961 to 1966 and is remembered most as the only major dissenter against the escalation of the Vietnam War. He refused to publicize his doubts, which were based on calculations that South Vietnam was doomed. He also helped determine American policy regarding trade expansion, Congo, the Multilateral Force, de Gaulle's France, Israel and the rest of the Middle East, and the Iranian Revolution. During 1942, he became an official of the Lend Lease program. During 1944 and 1945, he was director of the Strategic Bombing Survey in London. During 1945, Ball began collaboration with Jean Monnet and the French government in its economic recovery in its negotiations regarding the Marshall Plan. During 1950 he helped draft the Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty. Ball was the Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs for the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. He is known for his opposition to escalation of the Vietnam War. Ball also served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from June 26 to September 25, 1968. During August 1968 at the UN Security Council, he endorsed the Czechoslovaks' struggle against the Soviet invasion and their right to live without dictatorship. During Nixon's administration, he helped draft policy proposals on the Persian Gulf. Derived from a Kirkus review: George Ball--New Deal "dogsbody," Lend-Lease policy-shaper, strategic-bombing investigator, "ardent advocate of liberal trade," international lawyer, Under Secretary of State (1960-66)--was often told by his friend Jean Monnet, he recounts, that he spread himself too thin. But that very absence of driving ambition or a fixed commitment, whatever the cost to a public career, is a godsend in a memoirist: with the events, we get the afterthoughts, the open questions; with the certitudes, the doubts. A less inquiring, less skeptical man would also not have been the only top official to challenge, from day one, American intervention in Vietnam. Ball went to Northwestern and passed into the hands--manna for a shaky ego--of upstart instructor "Benny" De Voto and 18th-century specialist Garrett Mattingly. New Deal Washington was for him, as for others, a moment when "nothing was impossible." Chicago law practice began a 35-year friendship with Stevenson. Lend-Lease planted the idea of "a postwar economic environment" free of the constraints and conflicts of the inter-war period. On the strategic-bombing survey, in a still-armed Reich: "Speer met us in the Great Hall, friendly and self-consciously affable... 'I'm glad you've come,' he said. 'I was afraid I'd been forgotten." There then follows reducing Jean Monnet's visionary ideas of a unified Europe "to coherent expression"; the first exhilarating Stevenson campaign, the "dismal" 1956 anticlimax; the multifarious foreign-policy embroilments of the Kennedy and early Johnson years--the Congo, the Cuban missile crisis, Cyprus, de Gaulle and NATO, the Dominican intervention; LBJ himself; and, in Ball's words: "The Vietnam Aberration"-which may be the finest exposition extant of the refusal to ask "why?" and the reluctance to turn back. When Ball finally left, in late '66, he left quietly--so as not to use his "privileged information" to undercut the US; but that question, too, he throws open to discussion. It's one of the great, examined public lives of our time., W. W. Norton and Company, 1982, 2.75, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 1970. First Edition [Stated], First Printing [Stated]. Hardcover. Very good/Good. 25 cm. xx, 428 pages. Preface. Principal Personages. Part One--History Grimaces; Part Two--What Was To Be Done?; Part Three--Dissentions Become Evident; Part Four--The Intruder: The Atomic Bomb; Part Five--Unsettlement in the Center of Europe; Part Six--Opposing Ideas and Deepening Divergence; Part Seven--The Communist Thrust Confronted; Part Eight--To Salvage Western Europe--The Marshall Plan; Part Nine--The Fateful Spring of 1947--East and West; Part Ten--The Dangerous Crunch over Berlin; Part Eleven--While Berlin was Blockaded: Western Initiatives; and Part Twelve--The Schism--Atom-Haunted. Illustrations. Maps. Footnotes. Printed Sources Cited. Index. DJ is in a plastic sleeve and has some wear and soiling. Front flap corner clipped at bottom--price is present. Herbert Feis (June 7, 1893 - March 2, 1972) was an American historian, author, and economist who was the Economic Advisor for International Affairs to the US Department of State in the Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt administrations. Feis wrote at least 13 published books and won the annual Pulitzer Prize for History in 1961 for one of them, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference which features the Potsdam Conference and the origins of the Cold War. His first major book, Europe, the World's Banker, 1870-1914 (1930), impressed Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, who recruited Feis to the State Department, where Feis was an economic advisor 1931 to 1943. He served as a senior advisor in the War Department from 1943 to 1947. He wrote 11 major monographs over the next 25 years that provide a comprehensive history of American foreign policy from 1933 to 1950. He had access to secret documents as well as his own memories to trace the course that Washington followed in abandoning its traditional isolationism for a policy of global intervention. His books comprised the "orthodox" interpretation of history. His analysis of the origins of the Cold War was challenged from the left. However, scholarship since the 1980s has largely vindicated his interpretation of the use of nuclear weapons in 1945 as an effort to end the bloodshed as fast as possible. The Herbert Feis Prize is awarded annually by the American Historical Association, the pre-eminent professional society of historians, to recognize the recent work of public historians or independent scholars. Feis wrote: "The pan and design of this narrative were set by events and not by choice. In these crucial years that pattern of our present era was formed--although, it may be holed, not fixed. By 1945 the war was won and hopes were high. Be the end of 1949 these hopes had crumbled. The Western Allies and the Soviet Union were glaring at each other, both grasping atomic weapons. China had fallen to the Communists. The lines of division in Europe were trenched. The United States was stricken by dissension. Mutual trust had gone, mutual terror was becoming the decisive restraint.", W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 1970, 2.75, New., 6<
