Differential Information Economies - neues Buch

EAN (ISBN-13): 9783540269793
ISBN (ISBN-10): 3540269797
Erscheinungsjahr: 2006
Herausgeber: Springer Berlin
650 Seiten
Sprache: eng/Englisch

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ISBN/EAN: 9783540269793

ISBN - alternative Schreibweisen:
3-540-26979-7, 978-3-540-26979-3
Alternative Schreibweisen und verwandte Suchbegriffe:
Autor des Buches: dionysius, andrew ortony, wohlleben
Titel des Buches: information

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Daten vom Verlag:

Autor/in: Dionysius Glycopantis; Nicholas C. Yannelis
Titel: Studies in Economic Theory; Differential Information Economies
Verlag: Springer; Springer Berlin
650 Seiten
Erscheinungsjahr: 2005-12-28
Berlin; Heidelberg; DE
Sprache: Englisch
213,99 € (DE)
220,00 € (AT)
236,00 CHF (CH)
Available
XIV, 650 p.

EA; E107; eBook; Nonbooks, PBS / Wirtschaft/Volkswirtschaft; Wirtschaftstheorie und -philosophie; Verstehen; Differential Information Economies; Equilibrium Theory; bargaining; cooperative games; economic theory; economics; efficiency; equilibrium; incomplete information; information theory; mathematical economics; C; Quantitative Economics; Game Theory; Economics and Finance; Spieltheorie; BB

Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies.- Core Notions, Existence Results.- Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy.- Information, efficiency and the core of an economy: Comments on Wilson’s paper.- The core of an economy with differential information.- An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core.- On the continuity of expected utility.- Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core.- A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economiesw.- Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information.- Core and Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium Equivalence.- Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information.- Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies.- Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core.- Core, Pareto Optimality and Incentive Compatibility.- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information.- Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies.- Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core.- Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm.- Optimal multilateral contracts.- Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry.- Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans.- Incentive compatible contractible information.- Continuity and Stability.- Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete.- On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms.- Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection.- Non-myopiclearning in differential information economies: the core.- Value Allocations and the Bargaining SET.- Cooperative games with incomplete information.- The value allocation of an economy with differential information.- Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information.- The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information.- Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?.- Implementation.- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies.- An extensive form interpretation of the private core.- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies.
Gives an overview of differential information economies Explores all aspects of the field